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This corporate governance rhetoric can he traced back at least to the Cadbury Committee and subsequent inquiries which have helped to fashion the architecture of British corporate governance (Cadhurv, 1992) . These debates raised expectations in regard to the effectiveness of corporate governance codes, the monitoring roles of boards and especially of non-executive directors, the roles of institutional investors, and the effectiveness of shareholders in being able to deal with major governance matters requiring attention (Greenhury, 1995; Myners, 2001; Higgs, 2003) . The recent Walker Review of corporate governance in UK banks has sought to salvage many of these prevailing ideas by looking for best practice solutions to strengthen the largely self-regulatory corporate governance structures (Walker, 2009) . This approach followed a broadly Anglo-American tradition of seeking to minimize the involvement of government in markets and led to the development of international movements to replicate this rhetoric in the fabric of international corporate governance structures;
this is best illustrated in the development of the OECD's Principles of Corporate Governance and the replication of such codes widely 50
The failure of corporate governance and the limits of law 51 around the world (OECD, 1999; OECD 2004) . The OECD has more recently also looked for best practice mechanisms to strengthen corporate governance in banking institutions (OECD, 2010) . In many countries, and particularly in the UK with its Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2006) , the faith in these `soft law' corporate governance strategies was matched by a minimal development of legal rules, such as those regarding the issue of derivatives, and by a regulatory approach to markets which accepted the prevailing orthodoxy that markets could best be left to regulate themselves. The effect of the minimal regulatory influence of the state over financial markets was amplified by the role of government in promoting London as a leading financial centre and in encouraging foreign banks and financial institutions to base themselves in this city because of the low level of legal intervention that could be expected. As a consequence, London attracted many of the riskier financial operations of foreign firms such as Lehman Brothers and AIG, as well as securities fraudsters such as Bernard Madoff. ' The discussion of these other catastrophic failures is, however, beyond our scope here. This chapter will look at evidence that has emerged from the recent financial crisis regarding the weaknesses in prevailing corporate governance prescriptions; it will also examine failures in regard to legal mechanisms that had been seen as buttressing these largely private corporate governance ideas. It will focus mainly upon the UK, although similar findings could be made in regard to other markets, such as the United States and Germany (see further, Acharya et al., 2009; Hopt, Kumpan and Steffek, 2009; Posner, 2009; Mulbert, 2010 Coffee, 2006; Fuchita and Litan, 2006; Dravis, 2007, pp. 125-46 wrong. Rather than improving system resilience, the development of securitised credit has ended up producing the worst financial crisis for a century ' (Turner, 2009) . The dangers presented by these new business models were not properly understood in view of the short-term horizons upon which prevailing risk models had been built (Taleb, 2007) . The misplaced reliance upon faulty mathematical models also encouraged even greater risk-taking by issuers of new financial products Jett, 2009). Accentuating this risk-taking was the system of distorted incentives, such as large bonuses, which encouraged investment divisions of banks to develop and distribute new derivative products. The system of rewarding bankers by the payment of bonuses based on short-term performance often failed to have regard to long-term risks that were inherent in the products that had been sold by these banks (see further,
This conduct was built upon a conception of markets as ultimately being rational and efficient, assumptions that were found to be faulty; the concept of `irrational exuberance' has been used to characterize behaviour during market bubbles (Shiller, 2000; Fox, 2009) . However,
The failure of corporate governance and the limits of law 55 despite the prevailing view of the inherent rationality of markets, some economists such as Minsky (1986) and Kindleberger and Aliber (2005) had long known that financial markets were susceptible to crises during periods of speculative booms. But, as Richard Posner (2009, pp. 259-60) has argued, contrary voices such as these were often lost or submerged during the boom years due to the `overinvestment by economists, policymakers, and business leaders in a freemarket ideology that opposes aggressive government interventions in the operations of the economy'.
These ideologies were very influential in the UK where deregulatory and laissez-faire rhetoric was embraced with enthusiasm by both The FSA was subsequently to largely abandon exclusive reliance upon its `light-touch' and `principles-based' approach to regulation as being unsuitable in regard to financial markets as they had come to evolve in London. Instead, the FSA moved to what it was to call `the Intensive Supervisory Model'. Hector Sants, the FSA Chief Executive, explained the rationale for this model:
Historically, the FSA characterised its approach as evidence-based, riskbased and principles-based.
We remain, and must remain, evidence-and risk-based but the phrase `principles-based' has, I think, been misunderstood. To suggest that we can operate on principles alone is illusory particularly because the policy-making framework does not allow it. Europe, in particular, has a particular penchant for rules and in any case in a number of key areas such as prudential regulation they are indeed necessary ... Furthermore, the limitations of a pure principles-based regime have to be After this time the building society set up a commercial finance division and moved into commercial lending. In 1994 it acquired the North of England Building Society, based in Sunderland; this was significant as it added 43,000 new borrowers and over £1.5 billion in assets, giving Northern Rock assets of over £10 billion and making it one of the top ten players in the industry. As one observer has noted: `[o]ver four years it had increased its size threefold, its profits fourfold and had halved its management expense ratios' (Walters, 2008, p. 6) .
In 1997 Northern Rock demutualized and became a listed public company; this allowed it to raise more capital from markets. On 9 August 2007 interbank lending stopped suddenly due to fears that arose from an announcement by the French bank BNP Paribas that it would suspend three of its asset-based securities funds because of concerns that these could no longer be properly valued due to difficulties that were emerging in the US subprime mortgage market (Brummer, 2008, pp. 55-74 The market freeze of 9 August 2007 was similarly described by one financial journalist:
The events of Thursday, 9 August, had devastating consequences for Northern Rock as it felt the full blast of the credit crunch. The bank's risk committee, headed by Sir Derek Wanless, had failed to act as a restraining force on the strategy of the executive members ... Now that the credit markets around the world, on which it depended for 75 per cent of its funding, were freezing up it found itself caught in a perfect squeeze, unable to fund the loans on its mortgage book, many of which had been sold too cheaply. (Brummer, 2008, p. 67) The senior officers of Northern Rock were also severely shocked by the multiple failures that occurred at this time. The Treasury Committee went on to explain the nature of this governance failure when it added that:
Given that the formulation of that strategy was a fundamental role of the Board of Northern Rock. overseen by some directors who had been there since its demutualisation, the failure of that strategy must also be attributed to the Board. The non-executive members of the Board, and in particular the Chairman of the Board, the Chairman of the Risk Committee and the senior non-executive director, failed in the case of Northern Rock to ensure that it remained liquid as well as solvent, to provide against the risks that it was taking and to act as an effective restraining force on the strategy of the executive members. (Treasury Committee, 2008a, p. 19) In its response to these findings, the UK government agreed that the primary responsibility for minimizing risks and preventing other problems lay with the bank's directors. Criticisms were levelled at a number of key features of its board; first, the chairman of the board (Dr Matt Ridley, a well-known scientist) was seen to lack appropriate experience and expertise to chair a major banking institution;
secondly, the chief executive of the bank (Adam Applegarth) was criticized on a number of counts; thirdly, the board itself did not have significant levels of banking expertise; finally, its independent or nonexecutive directors seem to have failed to provide the kinds of checks and balances that it was said that such directors might provide to restrain an overly adventurous chief executive. Let us look at some of these concerns more closely (see further, Tomasic, 2008h, pp. 330-5 ).
As we have seen, the House of Commons Treasury Committee laid responsibility for this failure to respond to the bank's changing risk situation squarely on the shoulders of its board) 6 The senior independent director of Northern Rock, Sir Ian Gibson, had argued before the Committee, in the board's defence, that it had sought advice from the FSA and the UK Listing Authority on the state of its business model; it also sought advice from its own legal advisors, and as a result the Northern Rock board was `fully satisfied that we did follow the best advice and followed] it to the letter' (Treasury Committee, 2008a, p. 19 ). This confidence is in stark contrast to the subsequent findings of the Treasury Committee and many of those experts that it relied upon. '' Whether this effort to seek external advice is enough to In regard to non-executive directors, Ruth Sunderland, writing in The Observer, noted that:
Northern Rock's downfall highlights persistent weaknesses in corporate governance, not just there but at other blue-chip companies. The independent directors, who are supposed to act as a check on executive folly, did not restrain Adam Applegarth, the chief executive, from his turbo-charged business model, which was a bit like putting a Ferrari engine into a Micra.
Sunderland went on to ask why none of the non-executive directors `seems to have made the simple inquiry as to why a modest mortgage bank in Newcastle upon Tyne was playing at the casino end of the capital market'. 19 But Anthony Hilton, writing in September 2007, thought that the non-executive directors of Northern Rock were `not lightweight people' as they had considerable experience in the financial services industry and yet they either did not see the risks that the bank was running or, if they did, they were unable `to persuade the management to be more prudent'. He added that some non-executive directors may find it difficult to seek to restrain an overly zealous CEO who was at the same time being cheered on by the wider business community. `'' This was a point emphasized by Hilton when he wrote: `Adam Applegarth, the [Northern Rock] chief executive, was a much-admired man in the fund management community until last month. What chance do non-executive directors have to rein him in when the entire fund management community is on the other side urging him on? ' He added pointedly that `[w]e might conclude that the problem lies not in the quoted companies, but among the analysts and institutional shareholders who in their thirst for rewards too often drive executives to those very excesses of risk which end in tears. '21 It could also be argued that the board may have been encouraged to have less to fear of the risks inherent in its business strategy because these risks were being securitized and then passed on to Granite, Northern Rock's special purpose vehicle.
As it turned out, this was not as effective a way of avoiding these risks as they might have expected. In any event, it seems from the comments of independent director Sir Ian Gibson that the board would seek shelter in legal arguments to the effect that they acted reasonably and that they took advice from appropriate experts. However, some courts have become increasingly uncomfortable with arguments upon reliance where directors might be expected to know better or to be more diligent. 22 The old view of a director's standard of care and diligence, as expressed by Romer J in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd, 23 has come to be criticized with the rise of community expectations concerning the qualities that directors should bring to the boardroom. In developing a standard of `reasonable care' to be followed by directors, Romer j had drawn upon the discussion of the notion of reasonable care in the nineteenth-century decision in Overend & Gurney Co v.
Gibb. This was, of course, a case involving a company that was at the heart of the last major run on a British bank (see further, Collins and Baker, 2003, pp. 86-91) . In that case it was said:
... whether or not the directors exceeded the powers entrusted to them, or whether if they did not so exceed their powers they were cognisant of circumstances of such a character, so plain, so manifest, and so simple of appreciation, that no men with any ordinary degree of prudence, acting on their own behalf, would have entered into such a transaction as they entered into? 24 ... the change over time in the type of person appointed to the board has also led to a shift of view within company law about the appropriate standard of care for directors ... The primary focus of the law's scrutiny is on whether the board took reasonable steps to inform itself before it took the decision in question and not on whether the substantive decision taken was reasonable. (Davies, 2002, pp. 155-7) In However, industry leaders since the time of Walter Bagehot (1873) have for some time called for the adoption of a higher standard of care than that which UK courts have been prepared to articulate; the judicial view was that it was the responsibility of Parliament to state any higher duty of care and not the courts. For example, in more recent times, Sir Adrian Cadbury, writing about the role of the chairman of a public listed company, highlighted the rise in expectations of directors that has occurred and went on to point to the need for the training of directors; he pointed to paragraph A. 2.1 of the then UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance which stated that `every director should receive appropriate training on the first occasion that he or she is appointed to the board of a listed company, and subsequently as necessary' (Cadbury, 2002, p. 24) . Cadbury went on to discuss risk management and the role of the hoard in this regard and noted that:
A key point is that companies are continually having to adjust their plans and strategies in the light of a changing competitive environment and thus the risks they face, and the priorities to be assigned to them, are continually changing as well ...
It is for boards to set internal control policies and to assure themselves that they are working as they should. It is the job of management to put those policies into effect. (Cadbury, 2002, p. 220) Interestingly, the government-appointed Walker Review was also to criticize the standards of directors and called for amendments of the Combined Code to require them to be more actively involved in monitoring company matters. Walker, however, refrained from seeking to express this higher standard in legislative form, preferring the voluntary `comply or explain' model that had prevailed for some time.
In the context in which domineering CEOs were able to influence boards to adopt excessively risky strategies, Walker called into question patterns of behaviour on British bank boards and noted that: `The most critical need is for an environment in which effective challenge of the executive is expected and achieved in the boardroom before decisions are taken on major risk and strategic issues' (Walker, 2009, p. 12 ). Walker's preferred solution was to strengthen corporate governance mechanisms that were already in place because of the fact that many corporate governance problems were `organic, dynamic and behavioural' and better dealt with by non-legal mechanisms (Walker, 2009, p. 28) . This view is only partly correct, as there is much scholarly research to show that sole reliance on private regulatory enforcement alone will fail to secure improved regulatory objectives (see generally, McBarnet et al., 2007; Braithwaite, 2008) .
In any event, Walker focused on making improvements, such as in the composition of the board, obtaining greater time commitment by nonexecutive directors to their board duties, seeking a more active involvement of the chairman, increased board-level engagement in risk oversight and greater involvement of shareholders (and especially institutional shareholders) in discharging their responsibilities as owners. This has led the UK Financial Reporting Council to draft a Stewardship Code and to review provisions of the former Combined Code of Corporate Governance (see further FRC 2009; FRC 2010) . The key question here will be whether these `soft law' solutions will be sufficient.
It is too early to say whether such corporate governance changes are likely to prevent the collapse of another leading banking institution.
The collapse of Northern Rock clearly highlighted major deficiencies in the internal and external regulation of British banks and identified corporate governance issues as being important reasons for this failure. The academic literature would suggest that there is more room for improvement than that identified in the Walker Review. But the fact that the FSA has become more active in regulating British banks and financial institutions is a major departure from earlier patterns of governmental regulation of this sector.
Some conclusions
The failure of so many British banks during the global financial crisis has highlighted the centrality of corporate governance issues. These have widely been perceived to have been important in explaining why banks failed to respond to the risks that were to cause them to fail. In part, this failure has been attributable to an uncritical adherence to market self-regulation; in this context it was widely considered that soft-law codes of corporate governance were more effective than legislation or government regulatory action. To some degree this view has been echoed in the academic literature, which has pointed to the limits of law and the centrality of corporate culture in explaining corporate conduct (see further, Stone, 1975 
